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INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Greens/EFA Internet Core Group in the European Parliament, and a 
collection of its individual members,2 commissioned this analysis of 
potential impacts of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 3 on 
access to medicines in developing countries.”4 On the whole, ACTA 
negotiators created an agreement that shifts international “hard law” rules 
and “soft law” encouragements toward making enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in courts, at borders, by the government and by private 
parties easier, less costly, and more “deterrent” in the level of penalties. In 
doing so, it increases the risks and consequences of wrongful searches, 
seizures, lawsuits and other enforcement actions for those relying on 
intellectual property limitations and exceptions to access markets, including 
the suppliers of legitimate generic medicines. This, in turn, is likely to make 
affordable medicines more scarce and dear in many countries.   
                                                 
1 Sean Flynn is a Professorial Lecturer & Associate Director, Program on Information 
Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP), American University Washington College of Law. 
Bijan Madhani is a Program Fellow at PIJIP. Research assistance was provided by Michael 
Vasquez, also a Program Fellow at PIJIP. 
2 The Members of Parliament include: Jan Albrecht, Germany; Eva Lichtenberger, 
Austria; Judith Sargentini, Netherlands; Carl Schlyter, Sweden; Karima Delli, France; 
Sandrine Bélier, France; Franziska Keller, Germany; Christian Engström, Sweden. 
3 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 
2010], available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-
verification.pdf. 
4 Proposal for a Study: ACTA and its impact on the access to medicine, ACT ON 
ACTA, http://en.act-on-acta.eu/ACTA_and_its_impact_on_the_access_to_medicine. 
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The ACTA process and substance is counter to two sets of specific 
instructions contained in European Parliament resolutions and supported by 
international human rights law.  
(1) First, the negotiation disregarded specific Parliament instructions 
stating that processes for international law making impacting access to 
medicines and other important social interests be open, transparent and 
participatory.  
(2) Second, the substance of the Agreement violates Parliament 
demands that trade agreements in general, and ACTA specifically, not 
include “TRIPS-plus” measures that may restrict the global trade in 
affordable medicines. ACTA provisions that are TRIPS-plus and could 
restrict access to essential medicines in developing countries and 
elsewhere include:  
● Border measures requirements that expand the scope of 
authorized seizures to any case where a border agent “suspects” 
a medicine’s label of being “confusingly similar” to a brand. 
● Injunction provisions that require all ACTA members to put in 
place the basic legal elements that were used in the “Dutch 
seizures” cases in the EU, enabling authorities in one country 
issue injunctions preventing goods from entering commerce in a 
third country without that third country’s officials ever passing 
on whether the item would infringe its own laws. 
● Third-party liability rules that increase risks of erroneous 
injunctions and seizures of property from distributors, shippers, 
procurement agents and component suppliers of any generic 
product suspected of having a “confusingly similar” label. 
● Damages provisions that over-deter lawful conduct by 
encouraging determinations of damages in poorer countries 
based on the “market price” or “suggested retail price” of a 
branded product, even where that price is intentionally set at a 
level that excludes the great majority of a population form 
access to the product. 
● Information disclosure requirements that could be used by 
right holders to discover details on distribution chains of generic 
companies and mount aggressive and expensive litigation 
against suppliers and intermediaries to deter generic entry into 
key markets. 
● Expansion of criminal liability to cases where a supplier did 
not intentionally create or use the counterfeit label itself, thus 
raising the (over-)deterrent effect of trademark law for 
importers, including those of generic medicines. 
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● Expansion of seizure and destruction rules to require that, for 
example, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a medicine found 
to have a minor trademark infringement on a label be destroyed 
rather than re-labeled and re-sold. 
 
Given these paramount procedural and substantive flaws, this opinion 
concludes that the EU Parliament should withhold consent to ACTA.  
  
I. ACTA’S PROCESS DID NOT COMPLY WITH PARLIAMENT MANDATES ON 
TRANSPARENCY AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION 
ACTA is a sweeping legal framework agreement, creating a minimum 
standards that require or prevent changes in domestic legislation that affect 
a broad range of public interests.5 Unlike in multilateral institutions, 
including the World Intellectual Property Organization, where similar 
agreements are sometimes crafted, ACTA did not afford basic public 
participation resources. Ongoing releases of negotiation texts and 
background materials, institutionalized and regular briefings of civil society 
and the general public and public access to the negotiation venue were all 
absent.6  
Open policy making process are needed to promote democratic 
legitimacy and respect for human rights,7 as well as for the instrumental aim 
of promoting better policy outcomes more reflective of the fullest range of 
stakeholder interest. Recognizing these values and objectives, the European 
Parliament’s March 2010 resolution on ACTA contains at least nine 
specific demands for transparency and open process.8 Each of these 
                                                 
5 See Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty is not a Treaty, 26 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV.. 903, 908-912 (2011).  
6 See Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy Institutions 
20-21 (Program on Info. Justice and Intellectual Prop. Working Paper No. 6, 2010), 
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/9 (demonstrating that ACTA 
negotiations failed to satisfy best practices for transparency and public participation). 
7 See U.N. Special Rapporteur Anand Grover, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (describing human rights requirements to promote broad 
public participation in health policy making).  
8 See generally Eur. Parl. res. of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play 
of the ACTA negotiations, P7_TA(2010)0058 (2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. See also Eur. Parl. res. on the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), B7‑0617/2010 (2010), available at 
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demands and the response of the ACTA negotiation are detailed in the chart 
below. In short, ACTA’s negotiating process violated every one of the EU 
Parliament’s open process demands.  
 
 
European Parliamentary Resolution March 2010 ACTA Process (post-resolution)
2. Expresses its concern over the lack of a transparent 
process in the conduct of the ACTA negotiations, a state of 
affairs at odds with the letter and spirit of the TFEU [Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union]; 
Process not dramatically improved. No Public hearings held 
on draft text. Public health representatives continue to be 
consulted only in closed-door sessions with no access to 
text.  
[I]s deeply concerned that no legal base was established 
before the start of the ACTA negotiations and that 
parliamentary approval for the negotiating mandate was not 
sought; 
No legal base established before conclusion of ACTA 
negotiations.  
3. Calls on the Commission and the Council to grant public 
and parliamentary access to ACTA negotiation texts and 
summaries, in accordance with the Treaty and with 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents; 
One public release of draft negotiating text in April 2010.9 
Parliament given ongoing access to negotiating drafts after 
April, but public is not given similar access. 
4. Calls on the Commission and the Council to engage 
proactively with ACTA negotiation partners to rule out any 
further negotiations which are confidential as a matter of 
course and to inform Parliament fully and in a timely 
manner about its initiatives in this regard; expects the 
Commission to make proposals prior to the next negotiation 
round in New Zealand in April 2010, to demand that the 
issue of transparency is put on the agenda of that meeting 
and to refer the outcome of the negotiation round to 
Parliament immediately following its conclusion; 
Whether the Commission in fact pressured other partners to 
increase transparency is unknown because all negotiation 
venues and positions remained secret through the 
finalization of text in December 2011. Rounds of 
negotiations continued to be held in locations that were 
undisclosed until hours before their formal start.  
5. Stresses that, unless Parliament is immediately and fully 
informed at all stages of the negotiations, it reserves its right 
to take suitable action, including bringing a case before the 
Court of Justice in order to safeguard its prerogatives; 
 
After the resolution, the European Parliament’s 
International Trade Committee (INTA) was given access to 
negotiating text, but under rules prohibiting the sharing of 
text with uncleared constituents stakeholders.  
  
The Commission is now being sued by one MEP for a 
failure to meet Parliament’s demands.10 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B7-
2010-0617+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; Eur. Parl. res. on ACTA – preparing for the consent 
procedure, B7‑0619/2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2010-
0619&language=EN (demonstrating that political groups Greens/EFA and ALDE tabled 
identical resolutions containing policies similar to the European Parliament Resolution). 
9 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, 
April 2010, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf 
[hereinafter ACTA Text–Apr. 2010]. 
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6. Deplores the calculated choice of the parties not to 
negotiate through well-established international bodies, 
such as WIPO and WTO, which have established 
frameworks for public information and consultation; 
ACTA was not moved to a multilateral forum. 
8. Welcomes affirmations by the Commission that any 
ACTA agreement will be limited to the enforcement of 
existing IPRs, with no prejudice for the development of 
substantive IP law in the European Union” 
In the end, as discussed below, ACTA limits the ability to 
develop limitations and exceptions to intellectual property 
rights enforcement, thereby impacting the practical reach of 
intellectual property rights.  
9. Calls on the Commission to continue the negotiations on 
ACTA and limit them to the existing European IPR 
enforcement system against counterfeiting;  
EU academic analysis indicates that ACTA goes beyond the 
acquis communautaire.11 
[C]onsiders that further ACTA negotiations should include 
a larger number of developing and emerging countries, with 
a view to reaching a possible multilateral level of 
negotiation; 
No more developing countries are added to the negotiation. 
Despite the proclaimed intent to make ACTA a new global 
standard,12 only two of the 37 negotiating countries, 
Morocco and Mexico, were developing countries.  
 
II. ACTA DOES NOT COMPLY WITH PARLIAMENT ORDERS TO EXCLUDE 
TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS ON MEDICINES 
Following controversial interpretations of TRIPS requirements in a 
series of attempts to challenge facially compliant access to medicine 
policies in developing countries in the mid 1990s, a body of legal norms 
emerged that are critical of so-called “TRIPS-plus” measures that heighten 
intellectual property for medicines in developing countries beyond the plain 
                                                                                                                            
10 See generally Case T-301/10, In 't Veld v Comm’n, 2010 O.J. (C 260) 18-19 (Sept. 
25, 2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:260:0018:0019:EN:PDF. See 
also Eur. Comm. for Trade Karel De Gucht, Answer to a written question - ACTA — a law 
enforcement treaty?, ¶5, E-8847/2010, (2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-
8847&language=EN (refusing to answer whether Commission has “compromised the rules 
and regulations on access to information and transparency in the European Union” because 
“this issue is currently the object of a court case lodged by an Member of the European 
Parliament against the Commission”). 
11 See Opinion of European Academics on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
Institute for Legal Informatics (2011), available at http://www.iri.uni-
hannover.de/tl_files/pdf/ACTA_opinion_200111_2.pdf [hereinafter European Academics] 
(finding that: “ACTA provisions are not entirely compatible with EU law and will directly 
or indirectly require additional action on the EU level,” and advising, “as long as 
significant deviations from the EU acquis or serious concerns on fundamental rights, data 
protection, and a fair balance of interests are not properly addressed, to withhold 
consent.”). 
12 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 Report 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf 
(explaining that ACTA is designed to ultimately create new “global” enforcement 
standards).  
6 ACTA and Access to Medicines  
 
WWW.GREENS-EFA.EU 
meaning of TRIPS minimum standards.13 Implementing this trend toward 
protection of access to medicines in international trade policy, the European 
Parliament has repeatedly enjoined the Commission from negotiating 
agreements with developing countries containing TRIPS-plus provisions on 
medicines. Specifically: 
● In 2007 the Parliament resolved that the Commission should not 
negotiate “pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-plus provisions affecting 
public health and access to medicines” in “future bilateral and 
regional agreements with developing countries.”14  
● In March 2010, the Parliament specifically addressed the issue with 
respect to ACTA, resolving that “ACTA provisions, notably 
measures aimed at strengthening powers for cross-border inspection 
and seizure of goods, should not affect global access to legitimate, 
affordable and safe medicinal products – including innovative and 
generic products – on the pretext of combating counterfeiting.”15  
 
ACTA does not comply with these mandates. The ACTA agreement 
itself has several developing country members. And the policies it 
implements, by raising border controls in “in-transit” and exporting 
countries regardless of the ultimate country of destination, can impact every 
developing country that relies on shipments from or through European 
                                                 
13 See Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 ¶4 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (affirming that TRIPS “should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all,” and reaffirming “the right of WTO 
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide 
flexibility for this purpose”); U.N. Special Rapporteur Anand Grover, Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
¶ 108, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (“Developing countries and LDCs should 
not introduce TRIPS-plus standards in their national laws. Developed countries should not 
encourage developing countries and LDCs to enter into TRIPS-plus FTAs and should be 
mindful of actions which may infringe upon the right to health.”). 
14 Eur. Parl. res. of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines, 
P6_TA(2007)0353, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0353+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (resolving further that 
“measures to tackle counterfeiting need to be . . . reinforcing the regulatory capacity of the 
national authorities [not] increasing levels of intellectual property protection.”). 
15 Eur. Parl. res. of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of the ACTA 
negotiations, P7_TA(2010)0058 (2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. 
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ports. In this context, ACTA contains over a dozen provisions that require 
or encourage member countries to raise intellectual property enforcement 
standards on medicines, including on those medicines ultimately destined 
for developing countries. These concerns are described in more detail 
below. 
 
A. Border Measures 
One of ACTA’s most serious threats to access to medicines comes from 
the raising of TRIPS requirements for border seizures of suspected 
products. The border provisions were some of the most controversial 
aspects of ACTA. The controversies were triggered by a series of wrongful 
uses of border measures in the EU to detain lawful shipments of generics to 
and from developing countries, now generally referred to as the “Dutch 
Seizures.”16 In recognition of the abusive nature of the Dutch Seizure cases, 
negotiators exempted patents from application of the Border Measures 
sections.17 But medicines are also subject to trademark rules and medicines 
were wrongfully detained elsewhere in Europe on trademark grounds.18 
ACTA’s dramatic expansion of TRIPS border measure requirements, 
including requiring the authorization of seizures where border agents 
“suspect” a medicine’s label of being “confusingly similar” to a brand, will 
increase the risk of seizures of legitimate medicines.19 The lowering of 
                                                 
16 See Kimberlee Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text and the Failures of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 229, 245 (2011); Intervention by 
India, TRIPS Council, Agenda item ‘M’ – Other Business – Public Health dimension of 
TRIPS Agreement 2 (Feb. 4, 2009), http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/intervention-by-india.doc; Statement by Brazil, TRIPS Council, 
Agenda item ‘M’ – Other Business – Public Health dimension of TRIPS Agreement ¶15, 
16 (Feb. 4, 2009), http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/intervention-by-
brazil.pdf (stating the importance of the TRIPS flexibilities for public health via their 
inclusion in the Doha Declaration, while noting that the actions of the Dutch authorities 
did not comport with those flexibilities). 
17 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 13 n.6 (stating “[t]he Parties agree 
that patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall within the scope of this 
section”). 
18 An example is a German case where drugs were seized for bearing the INN name 
(mandated for labels in most countries) that was thought to be “confusingly similar” to a 
brand name. See generally Press Release, Health Action International, Another Seizure of 
Generic Medicines, (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5%20Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%20
of%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf. 
19 Compare Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
art. 58, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (requiring authorization to 
seize suspected counterfeit trademark goods in response to prima facie evidence from the 
8 ACTA and Access to Medicines  
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minimum standards for procedural rights and evidence before seizures may 
also implicate international and European human rights norms governing 
fair trials and takings of property.20 
 
B. Injunctions And Provisional Measures 
ACTA expands injunction and provisional measures requirements that 
could stop flows of legitimate medicines within and beyond member 
countries, even with no determination of an intellectual property violation.21 
Specifically:  
● While TRIPS permits equitable relief solely with respect to goods 
entering the channels of commerce within a country’s jurisdictional 
territory,22 ACTA expands injunction requirements to include ther 
prevention of any alleged infringement, including infringements 
taking place wholly outside the ACTA member country.  
● ACTA extends TRIPS requirements to authorize provisional 
measures from actual infringements to “suspect” goods,23 thus 
lowering the evidentiary threshold under which medicines and other 
goods may be subject to provisional orders interrupting supply.  
● ACTA’s injunction requirements apply to patents, unless expressly 
exempted by an individual country.24  
                                                                                                                            
right holder, and allowing, but not requiring, ex officio restraints of imports), with ACTA 
Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 13 n.6 (stating “[t]he Parties agree that patents and 
protection of undisclosed information do not fall within the scope of this section”); id. art. 
16:1(a) (stating that Parties “shall adopt” procedures where its customs authorities suspend 
the release of suspect goods on their own initiative); id. art. 16:2 (omitting any reference to 
infringements of domestic or foreign intellectual property law);    
20 Compare TRIPS art. 58 (noting that competent authorities may act upon their own 
initiative in suspending the release of goods when they have acquired prima facie evidence 
of infringement), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, arts. 16:1(a), 16:2(b), 17:1 
(mentioning a prima facie evidentiary requirement for suspensions only in the case of 
requests by right holders, not when customs authorities act on their own). 
21 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 12:1(a) (stating that judicial 
authorities have the authority to order provisional measures to “prevent an infringement of 
any intellectual property right from occurring”). 
22 Compare TRIPS arts. 44.1, 50.1(a) (stating that judicial authorities have the 
authority to order injunctions and provisional measures to prevent infringing goods from 
entry into the channels of commerce “in their jurisdiction”), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 
2010, supra note 3, arts. 8:1, 12:1(a) (including reference to the channels of commerce, but 
omitting the “in their jurisdiction” language). 
23 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 12:3 (“each Party shall provide 
that, in civil judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have the authority to order the 
seizure or other taking into custody of suspect goods . . .”). 
24 See id. art. 7 n.2 (“A Party may exclude patents and protection of undisclosed 
information from the scope of this Section.”) (emphasis added). 
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Together, these expansions of authority require all member countries to 
put in place the basic legal elements similar to those used in the “Dutch 
seizures.” Specifically, they enable authorities in one country to issue 
injunctions preventing goods from entering commerce in a third country 
without that third country’s officials ever passing on whether the item 
would infringe its own laws. Because medicines contain trademarks as well 
as patents, merely eliminating all application of ACTA provisions to patents 
will not solve this problem.25  
 
C. Third-Party Liability  
ACTA expands potential liability to third-parties that supply goods or 
services to medicines suppliers accused of infringing intellectual property 
rights. As discussed above, ACTA allows provisional measures 
(preliminary injunctions) against third parties to prevent an infringement 
from occurring by another party and allows injunctions against third parties 
to prevent goods that infringe an IP right from entering into the channels of 
commerce.26  
The scope of third-parties that can be held liable is potentially very 
broad. In the pharmaceutical context, third parties potentially liable under 
ACTA standards could include distributors, shippers, procurement agents 
and component suppliers.27 Third-party enforcement, including injunctions 
and other interruption of supplies based on a minimal level of suspicion, 
may deter various businesses in the supply chain from dealing in the trade 
of legitimate generic medicines.  
 
D. Damages 
ACTA’s provisions on damages encourage courts to adopt punitive 
measures of damages that may over-deter generic companies from 
competing with brand holders, particularly in developing country markets. 
ACTA expands TRIPS requirements by delineating specific measures of 
damages that each member’s authorities “shall consider.”28 The measures 
                                                 
25 See Directorate-General for External Policies, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA): An Assessment, 61, EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot7/12 (July 11, 
2011) [hereinafter ACTA Assessment] (noting that trademarks are frequently litigated in 
the medicines market and that trademark concerns frequently hinder generic medicine 
market penetration) 
26 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, arts. 8:1, 12:1(a).  
27 Brook K. Baker, ACTA: Risks of Third-Party Enforcement to Access to Medicines, 
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 579, 581 (2011). 
28 Compare TRIPS art. 45 (suggesting methods of determining damages that judicial 
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suggested by ACTA, including lost profits and the “market price” or 
“suggested retail price” of a branded product, 29 are highly inappropriate for 
developing countries. This standard would apply to every trademark 
infringement action on a challenged label, and could apply as well in patent 
litigation. In a world where brand holders traditionally offer no discounts to 
developing countries for high priced medicines, setting damages for 
intellectual property violations based on these factors rewards exclusionary 
pricing and over-deters generic entry to the detriment of access to medicines 
concerns.  
 
E. Information Disclosure 
ACTA expands requirements to authorize disclosures of information to 
rights holders in ways that may deter companies from working with generic 
suppliers and may enable strategic litigation to create barriers to generic 
entry. ACTA’s TRIPS-plus requirements in this area include:  
● Requiring disclosure of information about “alleged,” rather than 
proven, infringers;30  
● Removing a TRIPS safeguard that countries need not grant 
information to rights holders if it “would be out of proportion to the 
seriousness of the infringement”;31 and  
● Extending the duty to disclose information to a much broader range 
of information, including that “regarding any person involved in any 
aspect of the infringement or alleged infringement,” and “regarding 
the means of production or the channels of distribution of the 
infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services.”32 
 
In practical effect, the provisions could be used by right holders to 
discover details on distribution chains of generic companies and mount 
aggressive and expensive litigation against suppliers and intermediaries to 
deter generic entry into key markets.  
 
F. Criminal Offenses 
ACTA dramatically expands the scope of common trademark violations 
                                                                                                                            
authorities may authorize), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, arts. 9:3, 9:3(b) 
n.3 (including the TRIPS suggestions plus recommended formulas for calculating 
damages). 
29 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, arts. 9:3(b) n.3. 
30 Id. art. 11. 
31 Compare TRIPS art. 47, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11 
(reducing the safeguard to a “justified request of the right holder”). 
32 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11. 
11 The Greens | European Free Alliance 
 
 
WWW.GREENS-EFA.EU 
that can be considered criminal, thus raising the risks for generic suppliers 
that rely on similar labeling to create consumer confidence and meet 
regulatory requirements. ACTA’s definition of criminal offences for 
trademark infringement include the intentional importation and use of the 
good containing a counterfeited mark, rather than the act of counterfeiting 
itself.33 One could thus be held liable under this standard by intentionally 
importing a good with a counterfeit label, even if that person did not 
intentionally create or use, or perhaps eve know of, the counterfeit label 
itself. This could greatly expand the number of cases of trademark misuse 
that could be considered criminal, thus raising the (over-)deterrent effect of 
trademark law for importers of generic medicines and other goods.34  
 
G. Seizure And Destruction Of Goods 
ACTA requires that, “except in exceptional circumstances,” all 
intellectual property infringing goods must be destroyed without 
compensation. This is a dramatic expansion of the TRIPS requirements for 
destruction of goods. ACTA could be interpreted to require that, for 
example, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a medicine found to have a 
minor trademark infringement on a label be destroyed rather than re-labeled 
and re-sold. ACTA also expands criminal seizures from being a remedy for 
proven violations of criminal law to require seizures of “suspected” 
violations.35 This expansion may have the effect of leading to more seizures 
of legitimate medicines, particularly when coupled with the expansion of 
criminal liability discussed above. 
Each of these provisions is analyzed in more detail in the following Part, 
providing a section by section analysis of the ACTA text.  
 
III. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS 
This Part presents a section by section analysis of provisions in the 
ACTA agreement that may negatively impact access to medicines in 
developing countries. Each ACTA section identified is quoted in its 
applicable parts followed by a quotation of the provisions of TRIPS that 
bear on the same topic. An analysis section describes the ways in which the 
                                                 
33 Compare TRIPS art. 61 (providing for criminal procedures in the event of wilful 
trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra 
note 3, art. 23:2 (adding the provision for criminal procedures in the event of willful 
importation) (emphasis added). 
34 See ACTA Assessment at 61. 
35 Compare TRIPS art. 61 (providing for criminal seizures in cases involving actual 
infringing goods), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 25.1 (discussing 
“suspect” goods and “alleged” offences). 
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ACTA text exceeds the minimum standards in the TRIPS agreement and 
may negatively impact access to medicines in developing countries.   
 
 
A. Chapter II, Section 2, fn. 2: CIVIL ENFORCEMENT (SCOPE OF 
PROVISIONS) 
 
A Party may exclude patents and protection of undisclosed 
information from the scope of this Section. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 1, Art. 1(2) – Nature and Scope of Obligations 
● For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "intellectual property" 
refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of 
Sections 1 through 7 of Part II. 
 
2. Analysis 
Although TRIPS provisions cover a broad range of intellectual property 
rights, many of its enforcement and remedy provisions are limited to 
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy.36 Public health advocates 
have been particularly concerned with new rules that would extend 
remedies and measures traditionally restricted to copyrights or trademark 
counterfeiting to patents. One key reason for concern is that patent 
violations are extremely technical and hard to detect. Extending 
enforcement measures that rely on non-expert determinations, remedies 
without full hearings, and extension of liability to third parties and 
intermediaries who may have no ability to detect patent law violations may 
over-deter business dealings with generic drug makers. 
In early drafts of ACTA, there was no substantive discussion of the 
scope of the civil enforcement section.37 There was first a suggestion to 
limit the scope to trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy in an 
                                                 
36 See TRIPS art. 51 (only mentioning importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated 
copyright goods as subject to border measures). 
37 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft, Jan. 18, 2010, art. 2.1, available at 
http://www.laquadrature.net/files/201001_acta.pdf; ACTA Text–Apr. 2010, supra note 9 
art. 2.1 (making no mention of the scope of intellectual property rights covered by the 
Article on civil enforcement measures). 
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August draft. But other parties, particularly the EU, promoted the use of 
ACTA to broaden the scope of international enforcement mandates to all 
intellectual property rights covered by TRIPS, including, especially, patents 
and geographic indicators.  
The final draft of ACTA permits countries to exclude patents and 
undisclosed information from the scope of the civil enforcement section. 
This change from earlier leaked drafts significantly reduces some negative 
impacts on access to medicines.38 However, it is important to note that the 
inclusion of patents and data protection within ACTA’s enforcement 
mandates remains the default position. The provision that a country “may 
exclude” suggests that such exclusion should be the exception rather than 
the rule.39 This language may thus encourage countries to apply the ACTA 
civil enforcement provisions to patents and data exclusivity, and could be 
used by trading partners for this purpose.40 Allowing Parties to expand the 
focus of ACTA to patents or data protection can directly endanger the 
legitimate trade of generic products.41 
 
B. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 8, 1 – INJUNCTIONS 
 
Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its 
judicial authorities have the authority to issue an order against a 
party to desist from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that 
party or, where appropriate, to a third party over whom the 
relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent goods 
that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from 
entering into the channels of commerce.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provision 
 
                                                 
38 See ACTA Assessment at 60. 
39 See Baker, supra note 27, at 594 (noting that the permissive nature of ACTA’s 
exclusion of patents and data protection from the section on civil enforcement is ineffective 
unless a “a country actively chooses to exclude”). 
40 See id. at 594 (remarking on the possibility of subtle pressure as a result of the 
presumptive inclusion of patents and data protection in the scope of civil enforcement, and 
more active pressure from influential trade partners with the aim of maintaining the 
inclusion). 
41 Public Comment, Generic Pharma. Assoc., Comments of the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2 (Feb. 15, 
2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2010-0014-0113. 
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TRIPS – Sec. 2, Art. 44(1) – Civil and Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies – Injunctions 
● The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to 
desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the 
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that 
involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, 
immediately after customs clearance of such goods. Members are 
not obliged to accord such authority in respect of protected subject 
matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or having 
reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter 
would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.  
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA expands injunction requirements for member countries in 
important respects. TRIPS requires that member countries have authority to 
prevent intellectual property infringing “imported” goods from “the 
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction.”42 The provision is thus limited 
to goods entering the market of the country applying the procedure; it does 
not apply to exports or in-transit goods. In ACTA, these limitations are 
removed.43 The words “imported” and “in their jurisdiction” are absent, 
leaving a duty to authorize injunctions to halt the flow of infringing goods 
into any commerce, whether or not such commerce is in the country’s 
jurisdiction.  
Injunctions are a useful tool for reducing the prevalence of counterfeit 
goods in a market, but like all tools, they can be abused.44 When applied to 
international trade, they can prevent market entry.45 By mandating 
injunctions for goods not being imported into the country and not destined 
for that country’s markets, ACTA’s injunction provisions raise the 
possibility of aforementioned “Dutch seizure” type problems – i.e. where 
the authorities in one country issue injunctions preventing goods from 
entering commerce in a third country without that third country’s officials 
ever passing on whether the item would infringe its own laws.46  
                                                 
42 See TRIPS art. 44:1 (only mentioning importation of counterfeit trademark or 
pirated copyright goods as subject to border measures). 
43 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 8:1 (applying injunctive measures 
to all infringing goods that might enter into the channels of commerce, with no limitation to 
imports). 
44 See ACTA Assessment at 61. 
45 Id. at 60. 
46 See Weatherall, supra note 16, at 249 (explaining the danger of “in-transit” 
enforcement as the “extraterritorial application of the transit country’s” intellectual 
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The ACTA language also eliminates the second part of the TRIPS 
injunction language providing a safeguard not obliging members to 
authorize injunctions in the event that a person does not have “reasonable 
grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter would entail the 
infringement of an intellectual property right.”47 Since TRIPS safeguards 
are included for other provisions of ACTA, the exclusion of an important 
safeguard here raises troubling interpretative questions about the 
negotiators’ intent.  
Also of great concern is the extension of mandatory injunction authority 
against third parties. In the realm of the generics trade, these third-parties 
include active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”) suppliers, which provide 
materials for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, and transporters and 
registrants involved in the commercial and legal aspects of bringing generic 
pharmaceuticals to market.48 The application of injunctive and provisional 
measures to third parties associated with drugs alleged to have infringed on 
a patent or trademark may deter their involvement in the generics trade. 
 
C. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 9, 1 – DAMAGES 
 
Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its 
judicial authorities have the authority to order the infringer who, 
knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in 
infringing activity to pay the right holder damages adequate to 
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered as a result 
of the infringement. In determining the amount of damages for 
infringement of intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to consider, inter alia, any 
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may 
include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services 
measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 2, Art. 45(1) – Civil and Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies – Damages 
                                                                                                                            
property rights). 
47 See TRIPS art. 44:1. 
48 Baker, supra note 27, at 581. 
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● The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer 
to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the 
injury the right holder has suffered because of an infringement of 
that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in 
infringing activity. 
 
2. Analysis 
The ACTA provision on damages expands TRIPS requirements by 
delineating specific measures of damages that each member’s authorities 
“shall consider.”49 The measures suggested by ACTA, including lost profits 
of the rights holder and the “market price” or “suggested retail price” 
“submitted by the right holder,” are highly inappropriate for developing 
countries as they reinforce exclusionary pricing incentives.  
It is recognized that intellectual property monopolies on needed 
medicines in middle-income countries promote profit-maximizing pricing to 
the elite segment of the population (e.g. top 10% or so of the economy).50 
To promote access to affordable medications, developing countries must 
adopt policies that require or incentivize intellectual property holders to 
allow competition or set prices much lower than the profit maximizing 
level.51 Setting damages for infringements of patents or other intellectual 
property on medicines in developing countries at “lost profit” or the retail 
price demanded by the supplier works directly counter to this essential 
public health policy. Such measures would routinely overcompensate brand 
name drug suppliers for socially harmful pricing strategies and over-deter 
generics from legitimately entering markets. 
This provision can be contrasted with measures of damages that would 
flow from access to medicines concerns and human rights. For example, 
many patent laws, especially in developing countries, require rights holders 
to work the invention by serving the entire market on reasonable terms.52 
                                                 
49 Compare TRIPS art. 45 (suggesting methods of determining damages that judicial 
authorities may authorize), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, arts. 9:3, 9:3(b) 
n.3 (including the TRIPS suggestions plus recommended formulas for calculating 
damages). 
50 See Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification of Open Access to Essential 
Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 190 (2009) 
(indicating that a drug monopolist in developing with high levels of inequality will 
maximize revenue by selling at a high price with only the rich able to pay). 
51 See id. at 191 (demonstrating that the grant of open licenses on patents for essential 
medicines to permit competition allows markets to decrease prices toward the marginal 
cost of producing the drugs). 
52 See id. at 192 (describing the order by the South African Competition Commission 
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An incentive to meet working requirements could be furthered by setting 
infringement damages at very low levels where the infringer supplies 
markets left unserved by the intellectual property holder. Such a rule would 
reduce risk and promote entry for generic producers seeking to serve poor 
communities and severe needs. ACTA works counter to this goal.  
 
D. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 9, 2 – DAMAGES 
 
At least in cases of copyright or related rights infringement and 
trademark counterfeiting, each Party shall provide that, in civil 
judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have the authority to 
order the infringer to pay the right holder the infringer’s profits 
that are attributable to the infringement. A Party may presume 
those profits to be the amount of damages referred to in 
paragraph 1.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Part III, Sec. 2, Art. 45(2) – Civil and Administrative Procedures 
and Remedies – Damages 
● The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the 
infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include 
appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate cases, Members may 
authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or 
payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer did 
not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in 
infringing activity. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA removes the internal safeguard from the TRIPS requirement on 
restitution of profits that such awards only be in “appropriate cases.”53 It is 
unclear how the removal of this internal safeguard will be interpreted. One 
possibility is that it could prohibit appropriate exceptions to damages 
measures, such as the standard discussed above making damages 
                                                                                                                            
that authorized any person seeking to manufacture generic versions of certain patented 
medicines in exchange for a “reasonable royalty”) (quoting Media Release, South Africa 
Competition Commission, Competition Commission Finds Pharmaceutical Firms in 
Contravention of the Competition Act (October 16, 2003), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/MediaRelease.doc). 
53 Compare TRIPS art. 45, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 9(2). 
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determinations in reference to whether the infringer is supplying markets 
left unserved by the infringer. This section also appears intended to expand 
the use of damage measures in Article 9(2), identified as problematic for 
access to medicines concerns above. 
 
E. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 9, 3(b), fn. 3: DAMAGES 
 
The presumptions referred to in subparagraph 3(b) may include 
a presumption that the amount of damages is: (i) the quantity of 
the goods infringing the right holder’s intellectual property 
right in question and actually assigned to third persons, 
multiplied by the amount of profit per unit of goods which 
would have been sold by the right holder if there had not been 
the act of infringement; or (ii) a reasonable royalty; or (iii) a 
lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had 
requested authorization to use the intellectual property right in 
question.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 2, Art. 45(2) – Civil and Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies – Damages 
● The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the 
infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include 
appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate cases, Members may 
authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or 
payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer did 
not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in 
infringing activity. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA encourages damages to be calculated based on “the quantity of 
the goods infringing the right holder’s intellectual property right . . . 
multiplied by the amount of profit per unit of goods which would have been 
sold by the right holder . . .” 54 This could be a very invidious standard in 
many access to medicines cases. For example, pharmaceutical companies 
might serve high-risk/low-income countries – e.g. those with a GDP per 
                                                 
54 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 9:3(b) n.3. 
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capita below one dollar a day and an AIDS rate of 20 percent of the adult 
population – with a branded AIDS drug at a price of $12,000 per year. If an 
Indian supplier entered such a market and offered a generic drug at a price 
of less than $90 a year, but did so with a label that was found to have 
technically infringed on the trademark of the rights owner, what amount 
damages should be awarded? Multiplying the number of highly demanded 
generic units by the branded drug’s asking price would result in a damage 
award higher than the company could have ever received through marketing 
its own product. Such exorbitant damage awards go beyond mere deterrence 
of technical infringement and can instead prevent a generic manufacturer 
from entering an at-risk market entirely. 
It is noteworthy that the options for damage calculations include one 
that is fairly protective of access to medicines concerns. A damage 
calculation based on “(ii) a reasonable royalty”55 linked to a percentage of 
the generic price can avoid the problems identified with retail or “market” 
price valuations. In the case above, the damage award here would be a 
reasonable percentage of the $90 generic price, rather the difference 
between the $90 sale and the $12,000 expectation of the brand supplier. 
However, the fact that a legitimate generics manufacturer might be subject 
to trademark counterfeiting damages in the first place remains the area of 
greatest concern. 
As in other areas of ACTA, the problem is not that this provision 
mandates the worst possible practices, but it does appear to encourage them. 
If the agreement is adopted, it will be important for technical assistance to 
be directed at explaining the full range of interpretive options available and 
encouraging developing countries to adopt those most protective of access 
to medicine concerns.  
 
F. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 11 – INFORMATION RELATED TO 
INFRINGEMENT 
 
Without prejudice to its law governing privilege, the protection 
of confidentiality of information sources, or the processing of 
personal data, each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial 
proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, its judicial authorities have the authority, upon a justified 
request of the right holder, to order the infringer or, in the 
alternative, the alleged infringer, to provide to the right holder 
or to the judicial authorities, at least for the purpose of 
                                                 
55 Id. 
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collecting evidence, relevant information as provided for in its 
applicable laws and regulations that the infringer or alleged 
infringer possesses or controls. Such information may include 
information regarding any person involved in any aspect of the 
infringement or alleged infringement and regarding the means 
of production or the channels of distribution of the infringing or 
allegedly infringing goods or services, including the 
identification of third persons alleged to be involved in the 
production and distribution of such goods or services and of 
their channels of distribution.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 2, Art. 47 – Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies 
– Right of Information 
● Members may provide that the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority, unless this would be out of proportion to the seriousness 
of the infringement, to order the infringer to inform the right holder 
of the identity of third persons involved in the production and 
distribution of the infringing goods or services and of their channels 
of distribution.  
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA dramatically expands requirements to authorize disclosure to 
rights holders of information on alleged infringers. The ACTA language 
repeats the TRIPS requirement that members have a mechanism to order 
proven infringers to turn over information to “identity of third persons 
involved in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or 
services.”56 But ACTA expands this duty to:  
● include “alleged” infringers,57  
● remove the internal safeguard that countries need not grant such 
authority if it “would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the 
infringement,”58  
● extend to a much broader range of information, including that 
“regarding any person involved in any aspect of the infringement or 
                                                 
56 See TRIPS art. 47; ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11. 
57 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11. 
58 Compare TRIPS art. 47, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11 
(reducing the safeguard to a “justified request of the right holder”). 
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alleged infringement,” and “regarding the means of production or 
the channels of distribution of the infringing or allegedly infringing 
goods or services”59  
 
In deference to the privacy protections existing in some countries, 
ACTA makes this provision subject to members’ “law governing privilege, 
the protection of confidentiality of information sources, or the processing of 
personal data.”60 But for countries without such protections, invasions of 
privacy and business confidentiality could be particularly invidious in the 
implementation of this section.  
In practical effect, the provision could be used by right holders to 
discover details on distribution chains of generic companies and mount 
aggressive and expensive litigation against suppliers and intermediaries that 
deal with generic producers of allegedly infringing products. Applied to 
patents, the provision could be particularly troublesome since the actual 
determination of patent infringement is quite technical. But even applied to 
trademark infringement this provision is very concerning, since generic 
products often use labels, colors and other identifiers that are somewhat 
similar to brand products – to create consumer comfort with brand 
switching and maintain bioequivalence – while attempting to steer free of 
trademark violations. In this context, a great range of generic products could 
be subject to colorable allegations of trademark infringement even if the end 
products do not actually infringe.61 Beyond expensive litigation, the 
information provisions could lead to harassment of members of their 
competitor’s distribution chains by right holders. These provisions, in 
conjunction with those concerning third-party enforcement, can allow for 
the destruction of generic medicines found to be infringing on a trademark 
(or patent if a regime permits). Intermediaries might also be subject to 
heightened threats of injunctions, provisional measures, and criminal 
sanctions.62 
 
                                                 
59 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 11. 
60 Id. 
61 See generally Sean Flynn, Counterfeit Versus “Confusingly Similar” Products, 
PIJIP BLOG (May 7, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/pijip05072010 
(analyzing the ambiguity present in determining whether a good is confusingly similar, 
counterfeit, or neither). 
62 See Baker, supra note 27, at 595 (explaining how an innocent third party supplier or 
distributor could be subject to criminal sanctions as a result of ACTA’s aiding and abetting 
provision). 
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G. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 12, 1(a) – PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
 
Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities have 
the authority to order prompt and effective provisional 
measures: 
(a) against a party or, where appropriate, a third 
party over whom the relevant judicial authority 
exercises jurisdiction, to prevent an infringement 
of any intellectual property right from occurring, 
and in particular, to prevent goods that involve 
the infringement of an intellectual property right 
from entering into the channels of commerce;  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
TRIPS Sec. 3, Art. 50(1) – Provisional Measures 
● The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and 
effective provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any 
intellectual property right from occurring, and in particular to 
prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction 
of goods, including imported goods immediately after customs 
clearance; (b) to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged 
infringement. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA and TRIPS both provide for provisional measures, but ACTA 
expands the obligation by requiring authorities to apply provisional 
measures against third parties where appropriate.63 ACTA also eliminates 
the internal qualifier that provisional measures enjoining entry into streams 
of commerce be limited to such commerce “in their jurisdiction.”64 Like 
Article 8, Injunctions, above, this expansion raises the possibility of “Dutch 
seizure” type actions of one country to halt the shipments of medicines or 
other goods to a third country, even with no determination that the good 
would violate the intellectual property laws in that third country. A single 
                                                 
63 Compare TRIPS art. 50:1, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 12:1(a) 
(expanding the reach of provisional measures to third parties). 
64 Compare TRIPS art. 50.1(a) (stating that judicial authorities have the authority to 
order provisional measures to prevent infringing goods from entry into the channels of 
commerce “in their jurisdiction”), with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 12:1(a) 
(including reference to the channels of commerce, but omitting the “in their jurisdiction” 
language). 
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intermediary in a generics chain can have infringement alleged and related 
third parties can have provisional measures enacted against them. These 
provisional measures might require generic industry intermediaries, 
including active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturers and shippers, to 
cease business with generics firms to prevent “future” infringement – 
something that might cause irreparable harm to the generics market.65 
The ACTA text fails to incorporate other sections of TRIPS Article 50 
that reflect a more balanced concern for those subject to seizures. ACTA 
fails to incorporate, for example, Article 50(6) requiring provisional 
measures to be revoked “if proceedings leading to a decision on the merits 
of the case are not initiated within a reasonable period,” or 50(7) mandating 
“appropriate compensation” to the defendant of baseless suits “for any 
injury caused by these measures.” 
As in other areas of ACTA, the scope of the provision applying “at 
least” to trademark and copyright issues suggests a preference  default for 
applying the standards to patents and other disparate intellectual property 
doctrines as well. As discussed throughout this report, the application of 
remedies and injunctions to patent issues without adequate hearings and 
expert inquiry is inadvisable and should not be promoted even through soft-
law encouragements.   
 
H. Chapter II, Section 2, Article 12, 3 – PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
 
At least in cases of copyright or related rights infringement and 
trademark counterfeiting, each Party shall provide that, in civil 
judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have the authority to 
order the seizure or other taking into custody of suspect goods, 
and of materials and implements relevant to the act of 
infringement, and, at least for trademark counterfeiting, 
documentary evidence, either originals or copies thereof, 
relevant to the infringement.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
                                                 
65 See Baker, supra note 27, at 581 (predicting that necessary API suppliers, shippers, 
and funders could be deterred from involvement with generic producers); Peter 
Maybarduk, ACTA and Public Health 10 (Prog. on Info. Justice and Intellectual Prop. 
Working Paper No. 9, 2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/9/ (describing the chilling effect the 
uncertain reach of injunctive measures could have on the generics market). 
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TRIPS Part III, Sec. 3, Art. 50(1) 
● The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and 
effective provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any 
intellectual property right from occurring, and in particular to 
prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction 
of goods, including imported goods immediately after customs 
clearance; (b) to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged 
infringement. 
 
2. Analysis 
The final draft expands on TRIPS art. 50 to explicitly mandate 
authorization of seizures of “suspect” goods in the copyright/trademark-
counterfeiting context during civil judicial proceedings.66 Under this new 
standard, all goods suspected of infringement are subject to seizure in 
addition to the implements of their creation during proceedings on the 
merits. As a result, shipments of generic medicine related to those alleged to 
have infringed can be seized or their manufacture prevented with the seizure 
of necessary manufacturing apparatus. There is no restriction in this 
provision that goods seized be destined for a market within the jurisdiction 
of the enforcing country, Thus, this provision may be used to promote 
“Dutch seizure” type actions of one country to halt the shipments of 
medicines or other goods to a third country, even with no determination that 
the good would violate the intellectual property laws in that third country.  
 
I. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 13, fn. 6, SCOPE OF BORDER 
MEASURES 
 
The Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed 
information do not fall within the scope of this Section.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Part III, Sec. 4, Art. 51 – SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED 
TO BORDER MEASURES – SUSPENSION OF RELEASE BY 
CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES [No limitations as to the scope of border 
measures.] 
                                                 
66 Compare TRIPS art. 50:1, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 12:3 
(“[E]ach Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have 
the authority to order the seizure or other taking into custody of suspect goods . . .”). 
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● Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, 
adopt procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for 
suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated 
copyright goods may take place, to lodge an application in writing 
with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for the 
suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free 
circulation of such goods. Members may enable such an application 
to be made in respect of goods which involve other infringements of 
intellectual property rights, provided that the requirements of this 
Section are met. Members may also provide for corresponding 
procedures concerning the suspension by the customs authorities of 
the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from their 
territories. 
 
2. Analysis 
Border measures are methods by which customs authorities of member 
nations can seize goods suspected of infringement of intellectual property 
rights.67 In an effort to stave off complaints about ACTA from public health 
advocates, ACTA’s provisions on border measures have been made 
inapplicable to patents.68 This is a positive, but unfortunately limited 
change.69 ACTA still contains a dramatic expansion of border measures 
requirements to all intellectual property rights in TRIPS not within this 
narrow exception.  
ACTA’s expansion of border measures beyond “counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods” will notably include requirements that countries 
authorize seizures of suspected “confusingly similar” trademarks.70 “The 
inclusion of civil trademark claims in ACTA’s border measures creates 
                                                 
67 See Weatherall, supra note 16, at 244 (defining border measures as “procedures for 
the detention, by customs authorities, of goods suspected of infringing intellectual property 
rights . . . .”). 
68 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 13 n.6 (stating “[t]he Parties agree 
that patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall within the scope of this 
section”). 
69 The language of exclusion of patents in the Border Measures chapter is stronger than 
in Civil Enforcement. Compare ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 7 n.2 
(members “may exclude”), with id. art. 13 n.6 (“patents . . . do not fall within the scope” of 
border measures). But cf. Baker, supra note 27, at 593 (citing Council Regulation 
1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 (EC)) (“Unfortunately, this exclusion does not prevent 
ACTA members from unilaterally adopting patent-related border measures such as those 
currently codified in EC 1383/2003 . . . .”). 
70 See ACTA Assessment at 62 (noting that ACTA’s treatment of similar or confusing 
trademarks could lead to issues with the generic trade). 
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risks for access to medicines similar to those raised by patents.”71  
Unlike counterfeiting, in which trademarks must be willfully identical to 
the original mark, determination of infringing marks under the confusingly 
similar doctrine are quite fact and law intensive. And there is existing 
evidence of the wrongful use of this standard to delay shipments of needed 
medicines in Europe. German authorities used this ground to wrongfully 
halt a generic shipment of amoxicillin, the INN name, because the officials 
reasoned that it was confusingly similar to a trademarked name: 
“Amoxil.”72 ACTA exports the doctrinal basis of these EU seizures to all 
member countries, raising the risk of similar seizures of legitimate generic 
medicines elsewhere.73 
Aggressive enforcement of a right to preempt “similar” marks can also 
conflict with public health policy.74 Such policy may promote the use of 
similar colors, shapes and names for branded and generic registered 
medicines to promote generic substitution and avoid patient confusion and 
prescription errors.75  
 
J. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 16  – BORDER MEASURES 
 
1. Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures with 
respect to import and export shipments under which: 
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own 
initiative to suspend the release of suspect goods; and 
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request its 
competent authorities to suspend the release of suspect 
goods.  
 
2. A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to 
suspect in-transit goods or in other situations where the 
goods are under customs control under which: 
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own 
initiative to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect 
goods; and 
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request its 
                                                 
71 Maybarduk, supra note 65, at 27. 
72 See Press Release, Health Action International, supra note 18. 
73 See ACTA Assessment at 62. 
74 See id. at 61. 
75 See generally Flynn, Confusingly Similar, supra note 61. 
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competent authorities to suspend the release of, or to 
detain, suspect goods.  
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 4, Art. 58 – Special Requirements Related to Border Measures–
Ex Officio Action 
● Where Members require competent authorities to act upon their own 
initiative and to suspend the release of goods in respect of which 
they have acquired prima facie evidence that an intellectual property 
right is being infringed: (a) the competent authorities may at any 
time seek from the right holder any information that may assist them 
to exercise these powers; (b) the importer and the right holder shall 
be promptly notified of the suspension. Where the importer has 
lodged an appeal against the suspension with the competent 
authorities, the suspension shall be subject to the conditions, mutatis 
mutandis, set out at Article 55; (c) Members shall only exempt both 
public authorities and officials from liability to appropriate remedial 
measures where actions are taken or intended in good faith. 
fn. 13 
● It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply such 
procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country 
by or with the consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit. 
 
2. Analysis 
There is no requirement in TRIPS that members grant ex officio border 
seizure authority.76 Where members do give such authorization for imported 
goods, such seizures require prima facie evidence, must be followed by 
prompt notification of the importer, and, by referencing Art. 55, must be 
released within 10 working days if the right holder does not initiate a 
proceeding on the merits.77 There is “no obligation to apply” TRIPS border 
provisions to in-transit procedures.78  
ACTA escalates border seizure requirements while reducing safeguards. 
ACTA mandates ex officio seizures, extends the scope of requirements to 
include exports, and makes no mention of a prima facie evidence 
                                                 
76 See TRIPS art. 58 (addressing Member states where competent authorities are 
required to act upon their own initiative to suspend the release of suspect goods). 
77 Id. arts. 58, 54, 55. 
78 Id. art. 51 n.13. 
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requirement or limited duration of the suspension pending a determination 
on the merits.79 ACTA leaves the application of border seizure measures to 
in-transit shipments permissible, but does so with language encourages the 
practice.80  
These provisions raise the potential for abuse and wrongful detention of 
legitimate products. Infringement claims based on similar marks, trademark 
dilution, unfair advantage or damage to reputation are fertile ground for 
abuse of in-transit enforcement measures.81 Rights holders might use border 
measures to harass competitors producing legitimate generic 
pharmaceuticals, relying on unprepared and unqualified customs authorities 
to determine whether rights holder claims are reasonable or unfounded.82 
In-transit enforcement further complicates the potential for abuse or 
mistake.83  
 
 
K. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 17, 1 – APPLICATION BY THE RIGHT 
HOLDER 
 
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities require a 
right holder that requests the procedures described in 
subparagraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of Article 16 (Border Measures) to 
provide adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities that, 
under the law of the Party providing the procedures, there is prima 
facie an infringement of the right holder's intellectual property 
right, and to supply sufficient information that may reasonably be 
expected to be within the right holder’s knowledge to make the 
suspect goods reasonably recognizable by the competent authorities. 
The requirement to provide sufficient information shall not 
unreasonably deter recourse to the procedures described in 
subparagraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of Article 16 (Border Measures). 
                                                 
79 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 16:1 (stating that Parties “shall 
adopt” measures where customs authorities may act on their own initiative to seize goods 
without any reference to evidence requirements or a duration of the seizure). 
80 See id. art. 16:2 (stating that Parties “may adopt” procedures as opposed to having 
no obligation). 
81 See ACTA Assessment at 61. 
82 Maybarduk, supra note 65, at 17. 
83 See Weatherall, supra note 16, at 249 (“(1) the law of the country in which the 
customs procedure is invoked; (2) the law of the origin country; (3) the law of the 
destination country; or (4) by some combination (requiring, for example, infringement 
according to local and foreign law) . . . .”). 
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1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 4, Art. 52 – Special Requirements Related to Border Measures 
– Application 
● Any right holder initiating the procedures under Article 51 shall be 
required to provide adequate evidence to satisfy the competent 
authorities that, under the laws of the country of importation, there is 
prima facie an infringement of the right holder’s intellectual 
property right and to supply a sufficiently detailed description of the 
goods to make them readily recognizable by the customs authorities. 
The competent authorities shall inform the applicant within a 
reasonable period whether they have accepted the application and, 
where determined by the competent authorities, the period for which 
the customs authorities will take action. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA puts in place a streamlined system of border control that caters to 
rights holders while offering minimal safeguards or recourse for the 
wrongly accused. ACTA allows countries to rely on customs officials to 
perform complex adjudications on IPR issues at the border, rather than 
requiring judicial review,84 and adds to TRIPS requirements a duty to 
ensure that evidence requirements for suspensions “shall not unreasonably 
deter recourse to the procedures.”85 On the other side, ACTA fails to 
mention any concrete duration or required action for continued 
suspension,86 omits requirements to indemnify importers for wrongful 
                                                 
84 ACTA defines “competent authorities” as including the “appropriate judicial, 
administrative, or law enforcement authorities . . .” ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 
3, art. 5(c). Given that “judicial authorities” are specifically mentioned throughout the 
earlier sections on provisional measures, it is striking that Parties are instead encouraged to 
use “competent authorities” with respect to border measures. See id. art. 19 (requiring that 
parties adopt procedures for its competent authorities to determine whether an infringement 
has occurred). 
85 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 17:1. TRIPS contains similar safeguard 
language for rights holders in other provisions. See TRIPS arts. 54-56 (providing for 
safeguards for the importer, including prompt notice of seizure, a ten working day period 
for rights holders to begin proceedings on the merits and subsequent review, and the power 
for authorities to order rights holders to indemnify importers following wrongful or poorly 
conducted detention). 
86 ACTA does not repeat the TRIPS provision for the release of suspect goods if a 
proceeding on the merits has not been initiated within ten working days. Art. 19.  
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detention,87 and fails to require notice to importers whose goods have been 
seized.88 
Legitimate generic medicines have already been shown to be vulnerable 
to overzealous customs authorities and overbroad infringement 
definitions,89 and ACTA’s distinctly pro-rights holder border measure 
procedures exacerbate that danger. Generic medicines can be detained for a 
“reasonable” period at the request of rights holders with minimal evidence, 
by customs authorities with little experience in complex issues of trademark 
infringement. As ACTA has no requirement for notifying the manufacturers 
or importers, those subject to seizures will be less able to challenge 
wrongful detentions of legitimate generics. ACTA’s additional failure to 
insist on adjudication on the merits by judicial authorities could result in 
countries with less means allowing border authorities to make 
determinations as to trademark infringement for those generics. These 
factors combined can delay or preclude the arrival of necessary drugs in 
countries with a serious need for affordable treatments. 
 
L. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 17, 2 – MULTIPLE SHIPMENTS 
 
Each Party shall provide for applications to suspend the release 
of, or to detain, any suspect goods [7] under customs control in 
its territory. A Party may provide for such applications to apply 
to multiple shipments. A Party may provide that, at the request 
of the right holder, the application to suspend the release of, or 
to detain, suspect goods may apply to selected points of entry 
and exit under customs control. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 4 Article 51 – Special Requirements Related to Border 
Measures – Suspension of Release by Customs Authorities 
● Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, 
adopt procedures [13] to enable a right holder, who has valid 
                                                 
87 See id. art. 17:4, 18, 20 (making no mention of indemnification of the defendant in 
the event of a faulty claim, despite mentioning abuse of procedures, assurance for the 
defendant, and remedies). 
88 See id. art. 17:3 (ensuring that the competent authorities inform the applicant of the 
status of the application, without giving consideration to the defendant whose goods are 
seized). 
89 See supra note 16. 
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grounds for suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods [14] may take place, to lodge an 
application in writing with competent authorities, administrative or 
judicial, for the suspension by the customs authorities of the release 
into free circulation of such goods. Members may enable such an 
application to be made in respect of goods which involve other 
infringements of intellectual property rights, provided that the 
requirements of this Section are met. Members may also provide for 
corresponding procedures concerning the suspension by the customs 
authorities of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation 
from their territories. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA expands on TRIPS border measures by authorizing applications 
by rights holders for seizure of multiple shipments.90 This does not appear 
to be a change in the underlying legal landscape – TRIPS did not prohibit 
such applications and ACTA is permissive in this regard. But including the 
concept in ACTA may encourage more countries to adopt procedures 
applicable to multiple shipments. The potential problem for access to 
medicines concerns is the increased risk of arbitrary seizures of products 
that may follow from broad authorizations of border interdiction.  
 
M. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 20, 1 – DESTRUCTION OF GOODS 
 
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities have the 
authority to order the destruction of goods following a 
determination referred to in Article 19 (Determination as to 
Infringement) that the goods are infringing. In cases where such 
goods are not destroyed, each Party shall ensure that, except in 
exceptional circumstances, such goods are disposed of outside the 
channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm to the 
right holder. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 4, Art. 46. Other Remedies 
● In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have 
                                                 
90 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 17:2. 
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found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, 
disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as 
to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would 
be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed. The 
judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order that 
materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in 
the creation of the infringing goods be, without compensation of any 
sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner 
as to minimize the risks of further infringements. In considering 
such requests, the need for proportionality between the seriousness 
of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests 
of third parties shall be taken into account. In regard to counterfeit 
trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully 
affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to 
permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA requires that, “except in exceptional circumstances,” all 
infringing goods be “disposed of outside the channels of commerce.”91 The 
language in ACTA removes a key TRIPS safeguard, that “[i]n considering 
such requests, the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the 
infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third 
parties shall be taken into account.” ACTA could be interpreted to require 
that, for example, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a medicine found to 
have a minor trademark infringement on a label be destroyed rather than re-
labeled and re-sold. ACTA also removes mention of a safeguard for the 
accused present in TRIPS art. 59: the “right of the defendant to seek review 
by judicial authority” of any decision to dispose of infringing goods.92 
 
N. Chapter II, Section 3, Article 22(a) – DISCLOSURE OF 
INFORMATION 
 
a Party may authorize its competent authorities to provide a 
right holder with information about specific shipments of goods, 
including the description and quantity of the goods, to assist in 
the detection of infringing goods;  
                                                 
91 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 25:3. 
92 Compare TRIPS art. 59, with ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, arts. 19, 25:3 
(failing to mention mechanisms for the appeal or review of determinations of infringement 
and resulting orders of destruction). 
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1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 4, Art. 57 – Special Requirements Related to Border Measures 
– Right of Inspection and Information 
● Without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, 
Members shall provide the competent authorities the authority to 
give the right holder sufficient opportunity to have any goods 
detained by the customs authorities inspected in order to substantiate 
the right holder’s claims. The competent authorities shall also have 
authority to give the importer an equivalent opportunity to have any 
such goods inspected. Where a positive determination has been 
made on the merits of a case, Members may provide the competent 
authorities the authority to inform the right holder of the names and 
addresses of the consignor, the importer and the consignee and of 
the quantity of the goods in question. 
 
2. Analysis 
TRIPS requires member countries to have the authority “to give the 
right holder sufficient opportunity to have any goods detained by the 
customs authorities inspected” to substantiate any claims of infringement.93 
TRIPS includes a balancing provision giving the importer this same 
opportunity.94 ACTA adds that members “may . . . provide a right holder 
with information about specific shipments of goods.”95 There is nothing in 
TRIPS that would appear counter to such authorization within a member 
state and therefore this section does not appear to alter the legal background 
rules. Nonetheless, its inclusion in ACTA may encourage countries to grant 
such authorization. The new ACTA provision is notably one-sided – it 
includes an information right for the rights holder, but no comparable right 
or protection for the importer. This provision lends itself to abuse, as rights 
holders can seek out legitimate or technically infringing shipments of 
necessary generics and request for the detention of all of these shipments by 
the low evidentiary standard set out in Article 17. 
 
O. Chapter II, Section 4, Article 23 – CRIMINAL OFFENCES 
 
                                                 
93 TRIPS art. 57. 
94 Id. 
95 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 22(a). 
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1. Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a 
commercial scale.[9] For the purposes of this Section, acts 
carried out on a commercial scale include at least those 
carried out as commercial activities for direct or indirect 
economic or commercial advantage. 
[fn 9] Each Party shall treat willful importation or exportation of 
counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods on a 
commercial scale as unlawful activities subject to criminal penalties 
under this Article. A Party may comply with its obligation relating to 
importation and exportation of counterfeit trademark goods or 
pirated copyright goods by providing for distribution, sale or offer 
for sale of such goods on a commercial scale as unlawful activities 
subject to criminal penalties. 
 
2. Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied in cases of wilful importation and 
domestic use, in the course of trade and on a commercial 
scale, of labels or packaging: 
(a) to which a mark has been applied without 
authorization which is identical to, or cannot be 
distinguished from, a trademark registered in its 
territory; and 
b) which are intended to be used in the course of trade on 
goods or in relation to services which are identical to 
goods or services for which such trademark is registered. 
 
 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Sec. 5, Art. 61 – Criminal Procedures 
● Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall 
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a 
deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes 
of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available 
shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the 
infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
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predominant use of which has been in the commission of the 
offence. Members may provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual 
property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and 
on a commercial scale. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA expands the definition of criminal offences for trademark 
infringement by shifting the intent standard. The TRIPS criminal standard 
for trademark was limited to “willful trademark counterfeiting.”96 The most 
logical reading of TRIPS is that the intent modifies counterfeiting – i.e. 
criminal counterfeiting is the intentional creation or use of an unauthorized 
identical mark. ACTA shifts the intent standard from the use of the mark to 
the act of importation and use of the good. At least in plain language terms, 
one could meet the ACTA definition of a crime by intentionally importing a 
good with a counterfeit label, even if that person did not intentionally create 
or use the counterfeit label itself; indeed even if it was unknown that the 
label was counterfeit.97 This has the potential to greatly expand the number 
of cases of trademark misuse that could be considered criminal, including 
the use and trade in parallel imported goods.  
The potential extension of ACTA to the regulation of parallel imports 
puts it at odds with the European Parliament’s resolution on the proposed 
“directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights” (“IPRED2”). Under that resolution, member 
states are prohibited from applying criminal sanctions to cases of the 
“parallel importation of original goods which have been marketed with the 
agreement of the right-holder in a country outside the European Union.”98 
Parallel imports by definition carry the exact labeling as the original good. 
If the rights holder succeeds in declaring the labels on such goods to be 
counterfeit by virtue of their use in parallel imports without authorization of 
the right holder, then the standard for criminalization under ACTA could be 
met even without any intent to make or use the counterfeit label. The intent 
to import the good would be sufficient to meet the criminality 
                                                 
96 TRIPS art. 61. 
97 See ACTA Assessment at 62 (discussing the potential issues from confusingly 
similar trademarks). 
98 European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2007 on the amended 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
P6_TA(2007)0145, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0145+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#BKMD-12 
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requirement.99 ACTA’s Article on criminal measures for counterfeiting can 
be interpreted in a similar vein, as they extend to cases of counterfeiting on 
a commercial scale.100 This includes commercial activities carried out for 
indirect commercial benefit.101 The European Parliament’s position is that 
acts performed by private and not-for-profit purposes should be excluded 
from the scope of enforcement directives in the European Union, 
particularly IPRED2.102 ACTA would seem to contradict that position.  
The resulting effect of both of these criminal offence provisions could 
be the application of criminal measures for individuals or groups seeking to 
save money by parallel importing of medicines. In the trademark 
infringement case, criminal sanctions could result if the medicine labels are 
unlicensed in the country of import. In the aforementioned example 
involving counterfeit labels, criminal sanctions could attach because the 
importers indirectly benefitted commercially – they paid less for the 
imported drugs. No matter the textual basis for the alleged crime, the result 
remains the same – that innocent parties seeking affordable medicines are 
potentially subject to costly criminal prosecution. 
The impact may extend to third parties who supply or work with generic 
producers, thanks to a provision that ensures criminal liability for “aiding 
and abetting.”103 “An innocent supplier for a producer, who later turned out 
to be a willful counterfeiter, could suddenly be deemed a criminal offender 
under Article 23.4 of ACTA.”104 Like the third party enforcement 
provisions present in other portions of ACTA, this provision could deter 
involvement in generic manufacturing by necessary partners, raise prices, 
and hinder accessibility worldwide. 
 
P. Chapter II, Section 4, Article 25, 1 – SEIZURE, FORFEITURE, AND 
DESTRUCTION 
 
With respect to the offences specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 
Article 23 (Criminal Offences) for which a Party provides criminal 
procedures and penalties, that Party shall provide that its 
competent authorities have the authority to order the seizure of 
suspected counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods, 
                                                 
99 See European Academics, supra note 11, ¶8. 
100 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 23:1. 
101 Id. 
102 See ACTA Assessment at 62 (discussing the potential issues from confusingly 
similar trademarks). 
103 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 23:4. 
104 Baker, supra note 27, at 595. 
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any related materials and implements used in the commission of the 
alleged offence, documentary evidence relevant to the alleged 
offence, and the assets derived from, or obtained directly or 
indirectly through, the alleged infringing activity. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
TRIPS Part III, Sec. 5, Art. 51 
● Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall 
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a 
deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes 
of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available 
shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the 
infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the 
offence. Members may provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual 
property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and 
on a commercial scale. 
 
2. Analysis 
ACTA alters the TRIPS standard by making criminal seizures of 
property a remedy for “suspected” violations, instead of proven 
infringements.105 This expansion may have the effect of leading to more 
criminal seizures of legitimate medicines, particularly when coupled with 
the expansion of criminal liability discussed above.  
 
Q. Chapter II, Section 4, Article 25, 2 – SEIZURE, FORFEITURE, AND 
DESTRUCTION 
 
Where a Party requires the identification of items subject to 
seizure as a prerequisite for issuing an order referred to in 
paragraph 1, that Party shall not require the items to be 
described in greater detail than necessary to identify them for 
                                                 
105 See ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 25:1 (describing the applicability 
of the provision on seizure to “suspect counterfeit trademark goods” and referring to 
“alleged” offences).  
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the purpose of seizure. 
 
 
1. Related TRIPS Provisions 
 
[N/A] 
 
2. Analysis 
In order to obtain a seizure of goods for merely being “suspected” of a 
criminal violation, ACTA imposes a relatively low standard of proof – 
ensuring that a country “shall not require the items to be described in 
greater detail than necessary to identify them for the purpose of seizure.” 106 
This heightened concern for burdens on right holders requesting criminal 
seizures of property conflicts with civil and human rights that demand high 
evidentiary thresholds for criminal seizures. There is no mention here of 
safeguards for the rights and interests of importers – an imbalance that may 
lead to more unjustified criminal seizures of medicines in ACTA countries.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
ACTA proposes to require a broad range of TRIPS-plus measures on 
intellectual property enforcement that will predictably lead to increased 
burdens on the cross-border trade of medicines to and from developing 
countries. The agreement was negotiated behind closed doors within 
minimum input from public health and other public interest representatives. 
These substance and procedural flaws in the agreement violate specific 
commands in multiple EU Parliament resolutions.  
Taking into account the analysis above, including of the human rights 
obligations and international policy commitments of the EU Parliament, this 
opinion advises that the EU Parliament withhold consent to the ACTA 
agreement. Parliament should instead reassert the demands of its March 10, 
2010, resolution that international intellectual property policy be commited 
to “well-established international bodies, such as WIPO and WTO, which 
have established frameworks for public information and consultation” and 
that any agreements resulting from such process not include TRIPs-plus 
measures that raise barriers to cross-border trade in or access to affordable 
medications.  
 
 
                                                 
106 ACTA Text–Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 3, art. 25:2. 
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